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Summary 
An important issue in the life sciences industries concerns the nature of the incentive 
mechanism that should govern the production of innovation within this R&D sector. We 
look at the specific problem of coordinating the supply of inputs across very different agents 
- North and South - that must each supply inputs in order to generate innovations from the 
industry. The current arrangement in this industry provides for a single property right at 
“end of the pipeline”, i.e. where marketing of the innovation occurs. This property rights 
scenario raises two problems, one of efficiency and one of equity. The key question asked 
here pertains to the number and placement of property rights that should be instituted to 
address this property rights failure. Should one establish new property rights in traditional 
knowledge alone; property rights in genetic information alone; or in both? We demonstrate 
that in a world in which traditional knowledge and genetic information are complements in 
the production of R&D, a resolution of the property rights failure in genetic information 
also may resolve the allocation failure in traditional knowledge even in the absence of a 
distinct property right. The reason is that traditional knowledge of the nature of private 
information is comparable to a trade secret. Traditional knowledge holders may use this 
informational advantage to improve their benefit by capturing some informational rent. A 
new property right is important to enable bargaining and coordination to occur across the 
industry, but a single property right is probably sufficient to enable coordination between 
the two agents. 
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Abstract
An important issue in the life sciences industries concerns the nature of the incentive mechanism that
should govern the production of innovation within this R&D sector. We look at the speci￿c problem of
coordinating the supply of inputs across very di￿erent agents￿North and South￿that must each supply
inputs in order to generate innovations from the industry. The current arrangement in this industry provides
for a single property right at ￿end of the pipeline￿, i.e. where marketing of the innovation occurs. This pro-
perty rights scenario raises two problems, one of e￿ciency and one of equity. The key question asked here
pertains to the number and placement of property rights that should be instituted to address this property
rights failure. Should one establish new property rights in traditional knowledge alone; property rights in
genetic information alone; or in both? We demonstrate that in a world in which traditional knowledge and
genetic information are complements in the production of R&D, a resolution of the property rights failure
in genetic information also may resolve the allocation failure in traditional knowledge even in the absence
of a distinct property right. The reason is that traditional knowledge of the nature of private information
is comparable to a trade secret. Traditional knowledge holders may use this informational advantage to
improve their bene￿t by capturing some informational rent. A new property right is important to enable
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1￿We don’t want to forbid companies from using our genetic resources or traditional knowledge￿but they have
to reward the indigenous people fairly￿ , AndrØs Valladolid (Peruvian National Commission Against Biopiracy).
1 Introduction
The life sciences industries provide an interesting example of the need for global cooperation in the management
of an important natural resource, i.e. biodiversity. For biodiversity to provide continuing inputs into human
welfare requires cooperation between the life sciences ￿rms developing marketable products in countries with
large markets for pharmaceuticals￿the North￿and the ￿rms/communities in countries hosting the genetic
resources and/or traditional knowledge where the information is found￿the South. The host country provides
basic or pure information on potential solution concepts, while the R&D ￿rm supplies the practical capabilities
for developing these solution concepts into marketable compounds and products. In this manner primary
biological information is generated and channelled from a primary producer through a secondary R&D sector
in order to then become commercial products capable of addressing consumer needs.
We have examined the need for global cooperation in the management of biodiversity elsewhere. (Gatti et
al. 2011) In this paper, we examine the manner in which private industry could be an important part of the
process by which such cooperation might be engendered. The ￿ows of value that should reach the providers of
important inputs can be as readily channelled by private ￿rms as by public entities, if an appropriate property
right structure is put into place. The need for public sector involvement generally ￿ows from a private property
right failure, if one such exists.
There is a lot of evidence that property right failures do inhere in this industry. The bitter and lengthy disputes
over derivatives of the Neem tree and maca extracts are illustrative of this situation. In the infamous Neem tree
cases (Shiva 1996; Bullard 2005), a coalition of NGOs has challenged the patents held by US ￿rm W.R. Grace
both in the US Patent O￿ce (US PTO) and the European Patent O￿ce (EPO) invoking lack of novelty. The
inventions, it is alleged, were simply extensions of traditional processes used for millennia for making neem-
based products in India.1 Recently, the Peruvian National Commission Against Biopiracy (supported by local
￿rms and civil society organizations) has successfully challenged patents in the Japanese Patent O￿ce and in
France for products largely based on Andean traditional knowledge. It is also preparing a legal challenge in US
courts against the patent granted to the New Jersey company PureWorld Botanicals for exclusive commercial
distribution of an extract of maca’s active libido-enhancing compounds (Vecchio, 2007). 2
1W.R. Grace & Co was awarded a patent by the US PTO for its method of stabilising azadirachtin in solution and the stabilised
solution itself￿Azadirachtin is the active chemical compound contained in the neem tree. W.R. Grace & Co was also granted
another patent by the EPO for a method for controlling fungi on plants also derived from the neem tree. While the former patent
was upheld by the US PTO, the latter was eventually revoked by the EPO in 2005 (Bullard 2005).
2Maca is a tuberous root used by the Andean people for centuries as a food crop and medicinal plant to enhance sexual
performance and fertility in humans and livestock.
2The reason that these disputes exist is that property rights in genetic resources and traditional knowledge
are ill-de￿ned in the North. Despite the South’s contribution in providing necessary primary information as
inputs in the R&D process, genetic information and traditional knowledge generally do not meet patentability
requirements￿novelty and non-obviousness￿and receive little or no protection. The failure to protect these
contributions then results in a lack of investment in genetic diversity and traditional human capital, and in
ine￿cient ￿ow of information across the sector. 3 This sub-optimal situation may lead to a permanent loss
of both genetic diversity and traditional knowledge and therefore a loss of valuable source of improvement of
human health.4 Therefore the challenge for North and South is to coordinate their legal systems in a way
that allows the South to be properly compensated for investing in genetic diversity and the associated human
capital, and in supplying genetic material. In the absence of such coordination, bitter and costly legal disputes
and underinvestment in essential inputs are likely to persist.
We decompose the production function for innovations in this industry into a three-part a￿air, involving the
South’s genetic resources and traditional knowledge as well as the North’s technology. We further propose a
clear delineation between genetic resources and traditional knowledge. We de￿ne genetic resources to be the
￿library of evolutionary information￿ that is to be found in host countries of the South (Sarr et al. 2008). We
de￿ne traditional knowledge to be the ￿search services￿ provided that narrow the extent of the library that
must be searched in order to identify a solution concept to a particular type of problem. Therefore, traditional
knowledge is treated as a form of information (￿owing from traditional forms of human capital) held by the
South that allows the North to truncate the search for new leads, i.e. to search over a smaller quantity of
genetic resources. This bifurcation between the value of the base information and the value of a directed search
over it has been indicated throughout the literature (Rausser and Small, 2000; Costello and Ward, 2006).
Our purpose in this paper is to analyse North/South interaction in the context of this non-integrated industry,
as they bargain over the use of these three inputs. In particular, our aim is to determine the number and
placement of property rights necessary within this industry to induce an e￿cient ￿ow of information. What
more is needed to get e￿cient contracting to occur within this industry? Should these rights solely protect
traditional knowledge, or should they protect the genetic resource-based information alone, or both?
In Sarr and Swanson (forthcoming), we show that protecting genetic information alone creates the basis for
e￿cient contracting in many cases. But, when traditional knowledge is present as a trade secret, i.e. as the
South’s private information, e￿ciency arises under certain conditions only. In particular, when the North
3The importance of giving ￿rst innovators enough incentive to invest and innovate is particularly emphasized by Green and
Scotchmer (1995) and Scotchmer (1996) because no inventions or discovery would be possible without their contribution.
4Thus, to address this problem, Gehl Sampath (2005) suggests that the South’s information should be protected in a similar way
as the basic information provided by small and medium sized biotechnology ￿rms to larger ￿rms which use these inputs to process
a ￿nal product. It is thought that in the face of this incentive problem, the creation of ’informational property rights’ (Swanson,
1995) could provide the South enough incentive to maintain genetic diversity and traditional knowledge, and grant access to her
genetic resources. However, unless the property rights assigned domestically in the South are recognised across jurisdictions, the
hold-up problem analysed in Sarr and Swanson (2008) is likely to inhere.
3proposes the contract (screening case), the emergence of an e￿cient outcome depends on the magnitude of
the South’s outside option a￿orded by the existence of an enforceable property right in the genetic resources.
Conversely, when the South proposes an ex ante contract￿i.e. before learning her private information￿
e￿ciency emerges as she is the residual claimant of the cooperative surplus and has therefore the proper
incentive for e￿cient information trade with the North (signalling case). E￿ciency in this case hinges upon the
assumption of risk neutrality and the possibility for the South to o￿er an ex ante contract.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the set-up of the model. Section 3 analyzes the contracting
outcome when genetic information is protected by property rights in the absence of traditional knowledge. In
section 4, we investigate how the contractual terms change as we introduce traditional knowledge as the South’s
private information. Finally section 5 concludes the analysis.
2 The Model
This model builds upon the structure set out in Gatti et al. (2011). There, the authors set out the basic
structure of an industry spread out across two very di￿erent parts of the world (termed North and South).
These di￿erent parts of the world were distinct from one another in several important respects: endowments,
industries and institutions. With regard to endowments, the South was heavily endowed with natural capital,
and the North with technology (human capital). With regard to industries, the South was endowed with
traditional information and industries, while the North was endowed with R&D. With regard to institutions,
each sector had its own system of property rights and courts to de￿ne and determine them. We examined
in that paper the manner in which cooperation and con￿ict might determine outcomes at the level of global
bargaining between the regions.
In this paper, we wish to examine cooperation and con￿ict at a more micro level. We wish to look at how the
industries within these di￿erent regions (still termed North and South) might be able to achieve cooperation
across this non-integrated industry. We also want to understand how the courts and property right systems act
to determine how and whether the cooperative outcome is achieved, and the nature of that outcome.
2.1 Stylised Facts
As in Gatti et al. (2011), we model the R&D industry in the biological sector as a non-integrated vertical
industry of two stages as described in Appendix A.1. In the primary stage of the process, the ￿rms from the
South FS generate a ￿ow of information originating in genetic resources and accumulated human capital. In a
vertically integrated industry, this information would then be channelled to ￿rms in the North FN where they
would combine it with northern technology and marketing to place pharmaceuticals on the market to meet
consumers needs in the North.
4Through observation of natural diversity, FS may identify some biological activity in a plant variety and then
use this knowledge to produce and market herbal medicines. Thus, by application of her traditional human
capital hS (or traditional knowledge) to the genetic capital endowment g, FS identi￿es essential information e
embodied within herbal medicines H. The genetic material g is assumed to be present only in the South and,
for purposes of this analysis, we assume that all innovations in this industry are derived from the capital stock
g. FN, as the second innovator in this industry, is endowed with scienti￿c capital hN which he is able to combine
with g (and e) to produce a ￿ow of innovations d (disembodied information, e.g. identi￿cation and isolation of
active principles). This innovation d is then embodied within a pharmaceutical drug, which is then amenable
to intellectual property right protection (IPR). This industry is depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
The basic elements of the model are outlined here:
Two Agents. North (N ) and South (S ) refer to two distinct regions comprised of: (i) distinct ￿rms FN
and FS; and (ii) distinct markets protected by legal institutions or courts CtN and CtS. The two regions could
realise joint bene￿ts by cooperating in the production of R&D for health services, but must coordinate their
individual legal systems to generate these incentives toward cooperation.
Distinct Inputs within a Vertical Industry. Firms from the North and the South, FN and FS, can
cooperate for mutual bene￿t through coordination in the supply of inputs within a process of sequential R&D.
If they cooperate successfully, then a higher quality of health services is available to consumers. The South is
gene rich and technology poor. The ￿rms in the South FS are specialised in the provision of genetic material g
and traditional knowledge (TK). The North is technology rich and biodiversity poor. The ￿rms in the North
FN use information contained in the genetic resources g and may combine them with traditional knowledge and
technology in the North to search for new leads and develop new drugs d.
Distinct Products provided to Separate Markets. North and South have distinct markets for medicinal
products. This results from the control of access to the consumers in each region by the courts there, by reason
of the enforcement of property right systems that exist in each region. In each region, there exists a property
rights system that attempts to generate incentives for innovation by ensuring appropriation of the returns on
investments in that region. Firms that identify genetic resources g and traditional knowledge have recognised
property rights in the South. Likewise, the drug d developed by FN in the North has a recognised property
right in it. Property rights conferred by a given region exist automatically only within that region’s boundaries,
and must be adopted and implemented by the other region to be given e￿ect there. Court systems exist in
each region (CtS and CtN) for enforcement of property rights. From previous rulings, the agents attempting
to cooperate will have some common knowledge about both the likelihood of a court system protecting a given
property right claim, and the consequences that ￿ow from the court doing so (see section 3 below).
5Table 1: Stylised Facts: North/South interaction in the presence of TK
South North
Vertical Industry  FS: Upstream  FN: Downstream
Separate R&D Contribu-
tions
 Biodiversity Rich (Genetic Re-
sources g; Traditional Knowledge h)
 Technology Rich: drug development
d
Separate Markets  Herbal medicines
 FS has property right in g and TK
 CtS decides enforcement of rights in
g and TK
 Pharmaceuticals d
 FN has property right in d
 CtN decides on enforcement of
rights in d, g and TK
2.2 Cooperation and Con￿ict within a non-integrated Industry
We assume that FN and FS are two risk neutral agents that bargain over the use of their combined inputs
(genetic resources g and traditional knowledge h from the South and technology from the North) in order to
generate useful pharmaceutical products for marketing in the North. We wish to examine the anticipated results
from contracting under various assumptions regarding the property right and informational structure within
the industry. To do so, we ￿rst outline the anticipated outcomes from various bargaining processes, given the
potential outcomes of cooperation and con￿ict within the industry.
Assume ￿rst that FN o￿ers FS a contract to be granted access to g and hS in return for a transfer payment
t. If successful negotiation is achieved, then FN can use a subset of genetic information ( gN) and traditional
knowledge applied (hS) to develop a patentable product.
In the cooperative outcome then, the two parties receive the following payo￿s:

c





N(gN;hS) = N(gN;hS)   cN(gN;hS)   t (2)
where S and N are increasing and concave in their respective arguments; c
a
S and cN are respectively FS’s
access or supply cost of inputs and FN’s development cost. While c
a
S is increasing and convex in all arguments,
cN is increasing and convex in gN but decreasing in hS. Traditional knowledge has the e￿ect of lowering
drug development costs for example by allowing FN to increase its chance of ￿nding new leads and developing
successful new drugs (Costello and Ward 2006).
Now we turn to the chain of events that will ensue in the event that cooperation is not achieved. If no agreement
is reached, FS considers placing her herbal medicines directly onto the market in the North. The problem with
6this is that (in absence of complete and certain protection of the embedded information) the marketing by
FS will release some or all of the information it has produced. In response to such marketing (and by use
of the released information), FN is able to develop a new drug built using the information contained in the
herbal medicine. If FN does not invest in development, FS receives a pro￿t of S(gS;hS)   cS(gS;hS)￿where
cS(gS;hS) is the cost of developing the herbal medicine￿and FN gets nothing. On the other hand, if FN decides
to invest in drug development, then a court in the North decides whether or not it has infringed FS’s right to
its information. In this case a cooperative outcome is achieved (out of con￿ict) by reason of court’s decision
regarding the respective property rights of the parties.
In the situation where the court becomes involved in the matter, there are three possible outcomes. First, the
court in the North may ￿nd that the ￿rm from the South holds no property rights in the underlying innovation,
in which case the ￿rm from the South receives no compensation. Secondly, the court may ￿nd that such rights
exist but that no infringement of those rights has occurred, with the same result. Finally, the court may ￿nd
that the product released by FN infringes the rights of FS. Only in this last case is an ex post license for the
sale of the drug required.
We will assume that a ￿nding of infringement results in a situation where FS will share in the net revenues
received in the marketing of the competing drug marketed by FN. We further assume that the share of pro￿ts
appropriated by the Southern ￿rm is a known parameter , determined by reference to earlier court judgements
regarding intellectual property infringement case law. We will also assume that both parties apply a commonly
perceived likelihood () of a ￿nding of infringement.
If FN is not found to have infringed the rights of FS then the drug created by FN is independently patented
and marketed in the Northern market. In this case, the newly patented drug will compete￿competition in





N(gN;hS) cN(gN;hS). We will assume that the drug produced by FN based on FS’s information
may or may not involve additional functions (due to value added by FN).5





S(^ gS;^ hS) + N(^ gN;^ hS)
i
+ (1   )
c
S(^ gS;^ hS)   cS(^ gS;^ hS) (3)

nc
N = (1   )N(^ gN;^ hS) + (1   )
c
N(^ gN;^ hS)   cN(^ gN;^ hS) (4)
5The maca case is a good illustration. Local producers sell maca concoction on the local market and export a wide range of
maca-based products￿from powders and pills to jams and candies￿to Japan, the United States, Germany, Belgium and Canada
(Vecchio, 2007). The production of these products are based on traditional knowledge. The maca derivatives developed and
patented by the US ￿rm PureWorld rely heavily on Andean traditional knowledge without acknowledging nor compensating the
contribution of the TK holders.
7where  is the share of FN’s pro￿t captured by FS through ex post licensing or equivalently the damages paid
by FN for infringement; and ^ gS, ^ gN and ^ hS result from the ￿rst order conditions￿which are omitted here.
In summary, the sequence of decisions, taking the industry through the options regarding cooperation and
con￿ict, may be set out as follows:
1. FS devotes resources to invest in TK hS and to ￿nd genetic materials (e.g. medicinal plants) g containing
useful information resulting in herbal medicine H.
2. FN o￿ers FS a transfer payment t to grant her access to biological resources and TK used in the production
of H.
3. FS accepts or rejects the o￿er.
4. In case of rejection, FN may (or may not) decide to develop a new drug based on g and hS.
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Figure 1: Decision tree
In short, we are using this sequential process to describe the parameters relevant to the industries choice between
con￿ict and cooperation, and how these parameters will determine a) whether coordination is achieved within
8the industry; and b) the distribution of rents that occurs under that cooperative solution. In our view, the
industry should be able to achieve cooperation from the outset, and to generate a single innovation ( d) that is
placed onto the market in the North, without competition from any other product containing that innovation.
The importance of the alternative outcomes lies in their determination of the distribution of rents that results
in the cooperative outcome.
Hence, if terms are not agreed via cooperation, then the industry is able to place competing innovations onto
the market, and the courts will determine the outcome of this competition. The game structure above sets
out all of the various possible outcomes that ￿ow from this competition. And the initial contractual terms and
the distribution of bene￿ts achieved, will depend upon how the parties view this entire process, the con￿ictual
outcomes and the prospect of various court ￿ndings.
We now turn to examine how compensation for the South’s various inputs ( g and TK) will be determined within
this process.
3 Compensation in a non-integrated Vertical Industry
The issue of compensation within vertical industries has been examined extensively within the economics lite-
rature (See Lafontaine and Slade, 2007 for a complete literature survey). The issues addressed in this literature
concern the compensation received at the various levels of the vertical industry, depending upon the importance
of incentivising inputs supplied at each level (Lafontaine and Slade 2001), the importance of a property rights
structure (Grossman and Hart 1986), the transactions costs of remaining non-integrated (Williamson 1985) and
the costs of non-coordination. All of these issues are of course very important in the context of the industry we
are considering, and we will therefore look at the problem of structure within a range of contexts.
Initially we are going to consider the industry in its most simplistic format: it will consist of two players, with
only a single property right inhering in the product at the end of the industry (see diagram in Appendix A.1).
There will be no problems of information - and so no incentivising constraints. The agent at the end of the
industry (Firm F N) will be able to sell the ￿nal product to consumers on account of this property right, and it
is able to secure the required inputs from the earlier stages of the industry (Firm F S) if it has the participation
of that agent.
We argue that if there is full information and F N has the capacity to shape the terms of the contract￿because of
its situation at the end of the vertical industry and its proximity to market￿the bargaining problem degenerates
into a standard principal/agent problem where the agent F S has a weak bargaining position. The Management
Science literature provides rationale for the use of the standard principal/agent framework. This literature has
explored the division of labour and pro￿ts in a vertical industry with cumulative innovations involving large
pharmaceutical ￿rms specialised in developing and marketing new products and smaller biotech ￿rms specialised
in basic research. In this context, Lerner and Merges (1998) provide anecdotal evidence of cases where large
9pharmaceutical ￿rms (such as Ciba-Geigy) exploited their stronger bargaining power to negotiate contracts that
gave them almost ￿total control over￿ smaller biotech partners (e.g. ALZA Corporation). Rothaermel (2001)
also provides ample evidence suggesting that pharmaceutical ￿rms are in a ￿strong bargaining position￿due to
their specialized downstream assets￿￿relative to biotech ￿rms they contract with. Furthermore, Kinukawa and
Motohashi (2010) shows that ￿pharmaceutical ￿rms tend to extract more surplus than their biotech suppliers,
in that the contract prices of biotechnologies have been lower than their market value due to the stronger
bargaining power of the former￿.
3.1 Contracting genetic resources in the absence of traditional knowledge: Case
of Symmetric information
We have described the situation in which the Firm FN is a monopsonist in a vertical industry, a problem
￿rst analysed by Martin Perry (1978). Perry examined the incentives for vertical integration, whereas we are
considering the contracting process between the monopsonist and its suppliers within a vertical industry. In this
situation the question to be examined is how the payment from the monopsonist to the supplier is determined.
We consider the case where the supplier has the option of integrating forward into the monopsonist’s market in
order to o￿er its inputs directly to consumers in direct competition with the ￿nal product d.
In this section, we are assuming that FS has a potentially enforceable property right in g but that FN is a
monopsonist purchaser of that input and the holder of enforceable property rights in d. In this situation, we
believe that the monopsonist purchaser has the power to announce the terms of the contract on o￿er. This is
because any o￿er made by the supplier is simply revealing her information. 6 The objective of FN then is to
o￿er the minimum required payment to FS in order to acquire her participation in the supply of inputs g for
the production of d. Note that we also make the assumption that traditional knowledge is absent so that hS
will not feature in the payo￿ functions.
Therefore, in this context, FN proposes to FS a contract (gN;t)￿access to FS’s genetic resources in return for
a transfer payment t￿that maximises his own pro￿t subject to FS’s participation constraint, that is:
max
gN ;t
N(gN)   cN(gN)   t





Proposition 1: Suppose ￿rm FN o￿ers a take-it or leave-it contract accepted by ￿rm FS:
6Although we are commencing our analysis with the symmetric information case, the presence of private information will turn
out to be important in this analysis, and so there is no incentive for the supplier to announce potential contract terms, and so
volunteer information to the monopsonist.





de￿ned as in (6) and (7).
2) The equilibrium payment t

increases in the likelihood that the court ￿nds ￿rm FN to infringe ￿rm FS’s
property right.
Proof 1: In the equilibrium, FN will set t to make the participation constraint binding. If that was not the
case then FN could slightly decrease t, satisfy the constraint while increasing its pro￿t. This would contradict
the fact that we are in the equilibrium. The problem becomes:
max
gN





































= S(^ gS) + N(^ gN)   
c
S(^ gS) > 0.
3.2 Discussion
The compensation problem here devolves to the outcome characterized by equations (6) and (7). Given our
assumption that FN has the capacity to frame this contract (on account of its property right in the ￿nal product
d) the creation of a property right in genetic resources g addresses the distributional issues only to a very small
extent. The maximum share received by FS in this framework is obtained when the probability of a ￿nding of
infringement by northern courts is equal to 1, that is  = 1. The courts in the North play an important role
in the determination of the magnitude of the transfer in making these decisions regarding infringement. 7 FS
is compensated for its costs of supplying genetic resources in addition to its outside option which re￿ects the
7This is indicative of the meaning of the present legal disputes between North and South in the courts of the North. To the
extent that northern courts disallow the conferment of exclusive marketing rights to ￿rms of the North in drugs relying upon genetic
resources from the South, they are implicitly recognising the exclusive rights to genetic resources in the South.
11expected value of any products that might be marketed in competition with FN. When the genetic resource
right is recognised, that payment then includes some potential return on FS inputs into the production of the
joint product d. When the genetic resource right is not recognised, the payment to FS includes only the payment
for entering the market with the herbal product.
In short, when FN initiates the contract, the ￿rms are not really bargaining over the division of joint surplus;
instead, FS is simply being compensated for its participation in the vertical industry (see Gatti et al. 2011
for a similar result). Compensation for participation includes the costs of supply as well as a payment for
refraining from competition. Therefore, a property right in genetic resources is important for generating some
recognition of the South’s role in the vertical industry, but it does not have much impact on the distribution of
the production surplus within that industry.
4 Compensating Traditional Knowledge - is a property right neces-
sary?
In this section, we examine how the presence of traditional knowledge (TK) might in￿uence the contractual
process and the compensation terms between the parties. We consider TK to be an informational input: private
information held by the potential suppliers of g. Speci￿cally, we will assume that TK has the e￿ect of informing
FN about the most promising genetic resources for purposes of R&D. In this way, the quality of FS’s traditional
knowledge lies in her ability to truncate the search, i.e. to target the most promising genetic resources, thus
reducing considerably the number of resources to be searched (Costello and Ward, 2006). We investigate here
the contracting in regard to TK, where the knowledge about the genetic resources that are most useful for R&D,
is FS’s private information and can only be acquired by FN via contracting.
4.1 Traditional Knowledge as Private Information
We now set out how this baseline analysis is altered by the presence of TK, i.e. the private information held by
the ￿rm in the South. We examine here the case where the North has the capacity to structure the contractual
terms.
We say that FS holds traditional knowledge when she possesses information on the prospects of heterogeneous
genetic resources in regard to their usefulness for R&D. For purposes of exposition, suppose FS has two types
of information on the prospect that the genetic resources deliver a promising lead. There is a ￿high prospect￿
type  with probability p and a ￿low prospect￿ type  with probability 1   p. High types are of higher value
for two reasons: 1) they have a higher average value for producing information within the R&D process; and
122) they have a lower average cost when supplying information within the R&D process. 8 Thus, the usefulness
of the genetic resources for purposes of information generation is FS’s private information. Together these
assumptions constitute our de￿nition of the economic meaning of TK.
We now specify the ways in which the existence of this private information will impact upon the contracting
process. FN speci￿es the o￿ered contract enabling direct access to FS’s genetic resources. A contract consists
of access to FS’s genetic resources in return for monetary payment t. It is speci￿ed in terms of the di￿erent
types of genetic resources available. A direct revelation mechanism is a menu of two contracts f(g
N; t);(g
N;t)g,
one for each type of resource.
An agreement will be signed if transaction costs are small enough, and the participation and incentive compatible
constraints are satis￿ed for each type of resource. The participation constraints (or individual rationality
constraints IR and IR) ensure that each type receives at least her expected reservation pro￿t.
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the pro￿t di￿erential between the high and low type (i.e. the di￿erential value of her outside option within the
non-cooperative setting).
Note that the participation constraints IR and IR are type dependent implying that the high type has bet-
ter opportunities outside the proposed contract (larger expected reservation pro￿t) than the low type. This
speci￿city will lead to non-standard results.
The incentive compatible constraints respectively IC and IC ensure that each type is always better o￿ revealing
truthfully herself.
8For example, the knowledge that these are high prospect genetic resources might both contribute to a better targeting of the
resource-based information onto a speci￿c problem (higher value of information) and also do so in a much reduced search process
(lower cost of information).
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Assumption 1 says that the cost of supply is increasing and convex in the level of genetic resources provided
but decreasing in the type. The latter implies that the high quality type can make transactions for access at a
lower cost. This is because less search is required with high type information. Assumption 2 conveys the idea
that the marginal cost decreases in type: the high type enjoys a lower marginal cost of supply.





N). In addition, if the high type wants to mimic the low type, she would receive: t c
a
S(g
N;) = V +(g
N)




S(gN;) with  > 0 and 0 > 0 from assumptions 1 and 2. The term  refers to
the cost di￿erential of the two types for a given level of supply gN.
The incentive compatibility constraints respectively IC and IC can then be re-written as:
V  V + (g
N) (14)
V  V   (g
N) (15)
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14subject to (10), (11), (14), (15)
This analysis leads directly to the following proposition, detailing the e￿ects on contracting that result from
the existence of private information. Proposition 2 establishes that the factor most important in determining
the payo￿ to FS is the impact, if any, of any endowment (genetic resources or traditional knowledge) upon her
outside options.
Proposition 2:
When FS has private information about the most promising genetic resources for R&D purposes, FN may seek
cooperation by o￿ering a menu of self-selecting contracts f(g
N; t);(g
N;t)g to screen among the types of genetic




1.2 For V0 < (g
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N ), IR and IC are binding. The level of genetic resources supplied to FN is e￿cient for
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N), IR and IR are binding so that no information rent is given up to any type.
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151.4 For V0 > (g
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N), there are countervailing incentives and IR and IC are binding. The level of genetic
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Proof 2: See Appendix A.2.
As indicated above, the basic result is that the impact of TK (on contracting) depends primarily on its impact
on the value of the outside option. In parts 1.2 through 1.4 of Proposition 2, we see that the determining
factor is whether the incremental rent appropriable by the high type ( V0)￿by selling her herbal medicine in
the Northern market, i.e. under non-cooperation￿is less than or greater than the cost advantage appropriable
via contracting, .
We will now turn to the case where FS is able to make the o￿er to FN and then discuss the meaning of these
results.
4.2 Traditional Knowledge and Information Rents
We have now analysed the nature of the contracting that would occur within this industry, given that traditional
knowledge is treated as private information within a contractual relationship regarding genetic resource transfers.
The ￿rst point to make concerns the importance of the attachment of TK to the genetic resource rights￿for
purposes of reaching a negotiated resolution. Basically, the absence of any court-recognised rights in either TK
or genetic resources (i.e. when  = 0) will result in the lowest valued outside option being available to the
South. This represents the lower bound, and no additional value accrues to TK over that captured from the
competitive marketing of the traditional medicine ( H). In short, without a property right being conferred upon
both agents, there is no basis for bargaining over the division of joint surplus. The party without a property
right is simply o￿ered its participation costs.
On the other hand, if there is some prospect of recognition of an exclusive right to genetic resources (  > 0),
then it is possible to add the value of private information to that of genetic resources. The importance of private
16information is that it might confer an information rent upon its holder. Our model departs from the standard
prediction that informational advantage confers a rent upon the promising type only because the participation
constraints are type-dependent. Whether FN gives up information rent and to which type depends instead upon
the value of V0, i.e. the di￿erence between the outside option of the high type and that of the low type. When
the high type enjoys a highly pro￿table outside opportunity relative to the low type, the contract must o￿er her
a large transfer. This contract must also reward the low type to prevent her from misrepresenting the quality
of her information since the additional cost she incurs by lying, i.e. (g
N) is smaller than the pro￿t di￿erential
V0. To ensure incentive compatibility, FN will give her an information rent V = V   (g
N).9 In this case
FS’s informational advantage works more e￿ectively in competition with FN than it does in cooperation, and
therefore her threat not to cooperate is credible (as in case 1.4 of Proposition 2). Thus, FS’s private information
creates a bargaining advantage: the existence of TK confers a clear-cut increase in FS’s share of the production
surplus.
If FS’s primary informational advantage lies in her supply costs rather than in her outside option￿that is,
the di￿erential in reservation pro￿t V0 does not exceed the cost di￿erential between the high type and the low
type￿then the bene￿t conferred by private information comes from the high type’s ability to mimic the low
type, taking advantage of the supply costs di￿erential (as in case 1.2 of Proposition 2). In this case, the high
type is able to appropriate some informational rent by reason of the asymmetric information whereas the low
type is excluded from the sharing of the surplus .10
If, however, FS’s informational advantage lies above the cost advantage for the high type resources but below
the cost of lying for the low type, then FN is able to screen e￿ectively between the two types and eliminate
all informational advantages (as in case 1.3 of Proposition 2). Indeed, the cost di￿erentials are su￿ciently
di￿erent to enable screening between them. For intermediate values of V0, FN can impose incentive compatible
contracts where both types of genetic resources receive their expected reservation pro￿t; that is, no information
rent is given away. This is because no agent has an incentive to misrepresent her type so that the symmetric
information outcome (see section 3) can be implemented.
In sum, the fact that there exists private information on the genetic resources that are most promising may
or may not alter the contractual terms o￿ered to FS. So long as the private information does not impact
the outside option in a substantial manner (as de￿ned above in Proposition 2), the contract can replicate the
complete information outcome. Then there are no informational rents to be appropriated by FS. On the other
hand, if the outside option is signi￿cantly a￿ected by the private information, the contractual terms will be
altered in one of the ways described above, and this may result in additional rents for FS accruing to either the
low type or the high type information provider. These informational rents would create additional incentives
9This informational rent is decreasing in g
N. Thus an upward distortion in the supply of high quality genetic material g
N would
allow FN to minimise this informational rent.
10It is important to recognise that the rent given up to the high type increases in g
N
, implying that a reduction in g
N
will help




in order to minimise rent-sharing.
17for investment in the provision of these resources to the R&D process, enhancing the e￿ciency of the R&D
process.11
Given that FS uses her private information to extract some informational rent, it is important to know whether
this private information provides incentives to invest optimally in traditional knowledge. The answer will depend
on the source of the high type advantage, i.e. the access cost advantage and the outside opportunity advantage.
When the high type’s advantage derives from the cost of access, then she has strong incentive to invest in
human capital to keep her edge and continue to capture informational rent. At the same time, if the low type
wants to improve her position by narrowing her cost disadvantage, she too has to invest in TK. By contrast, if
the high type’s advantage stems from the outside opportunity di￿erential, whether she has incentive to invest
in traditional knowledge, depends on the source of the di￿erential. If the advantage in the reservation pro￿t
comes from the quality of the information, then this will certainly induce human capital investment. However,
if this di￿erential is only vaguely related to the quality of the information that enables to truncate the search
then the production of TK is unlikely to be incentivised. This would be the case if for example the advantage
in the reservation pro￿t lies in the high type’s marketing ability to target e￿ectively consumers in the North.
4.3 The Role of Property Rights in Resolving Con￿ict
We have been considering how property rights might be used to generate cooperative outcomes within a non-
integrated vertical industry, such as often exists within the life sciences. We ￿nd that property rights are both
important and unimportant in aiding cooperation and surplus-sharing.
The ￿rst point is that a recognised right in genetic resources is critical to encouraging bargaining within this
industry. Without a recognised and enforceable right in genetic resources, the contribution of the South is
only recognised to the extent of its supply costs and its threat of entry. There is not an explicit term in the
compensation formula recognising the inputs of South into joint production, unless there the courts of the
North o￿er to enforce rights in g against ￿rms from the North. Despite this, there is little enhanced sharing of
product from the creation of such a right. The basis of compensation of such inputs continues to be primarily
the minimum required compensation for participation by such suppliers.
The result is the converse in the case of TK. In the context of this input, it is very likely that some rent-
sharing can result, even without the presence of an explicit property right in TK. The fact that TK is private
information is su￿cient to confer advantages upon FS, and alter the bargaining environment which determines
the level of FS’s share of the surplus. The existence of a property right in genetic resource-based information
11Informational rents may contribute to their own types of ine￿ciencies, however, as e￿ciency is lost whenever FS has an
incentive to misrepresent herself to capture some information rent and appropriate some of the cooperative surplus. This places
FN in the situation in which he will move away from productive e￿ciency in order to minimise rent-sharing. That is, to minimise
rent-sharing, FN has to decrease g
N
(in case of low V0), and increase g







18retains its importance as the value of the outside option remains dependent upon the enforcement of this right
in the Northern market. If the court holds that FN has not infringed FS’s right￿i.e. if the drug is distinctive
enough from the herbal medicine marketed in the Northern market￿then FS will receive little compensation
under cooperation. If however, the court rules that FN has infringed the right, then FS will receive a substantial
payo￿ based on her ability to license her right after the court’s decision. Since FS depends upon the underlying
right to genetic resource information to protect its release of information on the market, this much is necessary
to protect both.12
In this way, the role of TK is likely to enhance the value of FS’s underlying genetic resources, but only if there is
a potentially recognisable claim in those genetic resources to begin with. This indicates that it is not necessary
for a property right to be conferred in everything of value which FS contributes to. It is only important to create
a right in an output which FS is able to market independent of cooperation (i.e. in competition with FN). Once
that right is recognised, FS’s other contributions may be able to be channelled through the existing right in
terms of its impacts upon the outside option. Essentially, FS’s private information acts as a trade secret which
is revealed to FN only against due compensation and the willingness to pay for this secret increases with the
usefulness of the information to FN. Keeping this information secret enables FS to extract some information
rent and thereby appropriate part of the production surplus under the conditions discussed in section 4.1. In
general, keeping traditional knowledge as private information might compromise e￿ciency but favour the South
as far as the distribution of pro￿ts is concerned.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analysed a simple model of the interaction between North and South in relation to the establish-
ment of property rights to protect genetic resources and traditional knowledge. We have stylised the North as
rich in human capital but in need of essential genetic resources and traditional knowledge only available in the
South to make innovations in the life sciences industries. We examine the impacts upon the cumulative research
setting of assigning a second property right to the resource-based information held by the ￿rms in South. In
doing so, we investigate how this can achieve e￿ciency and discuss the implications for the division of the pro￿t.
We show that the creation of a property right in genetic resources in the absence of traditional knowledge￿
under complete information￿ yields an e￿cient supply of resources. Crucial to the division of the joint pro￿t is
that this exclusive right be recognised by courts in the North. This right allows the genetic resources holder to
market her products￿derived from the protected genetic resources￿in the North, which gives her an outside
option. When such right exists, the division of the pro￿t depends on whether the ￿rms in the North infringe
this right. Note also that in this framework, the ￿rm o￿ering the contract will reap all the cooperative surplus.
So, a property right in genetic resources is crucial to bargaining, but not that important to determining the
division of surplus.
12It is straight forward to show that FS’s compensation increases with .
19On the other hand, when traditional knowledge is de￿ned as the private information held by the South on the
prospect of individual genetic resources to yield a successful search, its role in bargaining is the converse. In the
presence of traditional knowledge, the ￿rms in the South have various means of generating an additional return.
Either they can misrepresent the quality of their information￿and hence attempt to generate an information
rent￿or they can hope that the existence of promising resources increases the perceived value of their outside
option. Any factor that increases the value of their outside option￿or reduces the value of the Northern ￿rms’
outside option￿increases the credibility of the threat to compete (rather than cooperate) and hence enhances
their payo￿ under cooperation.
Critically, it is not necessary to establish a separate property right in traditional knowledge to appropriate this
enhanced return. The granting of a single property right (to g) to the Southern ￿rms is probably su￿cient to
establish a channel whereby they are able to appropriate the value of their di￿erent types of contributions to
the industry.
Essentially, we show that the capacity of Southern ￿rms to share in the rents from the R&D sector to which
they contribute depends on the existence of an independent property right in the genetic resources. This
independent right gives them a greater outside option and establishes the baseline upon which contracting
occurs, and hence creates the basis upon which Southern ￿rms may demand compensation in line with their
contribution. Importantly we also show that it is not necessary to have a ￿property right in each and every
thing￿ in order to have more equitable contractual terms. Once each agent is possessed of a single right, this may
be su￿cient to induce bargaining. Other valuable inputs may be able to earn their returns through association
with the input in which a property right is recognised. Thus, we demonstrate that￿to the extent that TK is
private information￿separate property right is not necessary to earn a separate return on this input.
Overall, we can say very little about e￿ciency in an industry such as this one￿by de￿nition an industry replete
with government-protected monopolies lies within the realm of the second best. It does seem crucial that
such industries should be subject to incentive systems that are able to adequately reward all agents supplying
important inputs to production. We have shown that a privately organised industry that provides for a single
property right at the ￿end of the pipeline￿￿i.e. where marketing of the innovation occurs￿is likely to reward
essential suppliers by means of the lowest possible participation payment. This arrangement may not provide
incentives for those agents to invest in the ongoing supply of those inputs in accordance with Hart and Moore
(1990). We have established that it is critical to create at least as many property rights as there are agents to
incentivise the various private agents along the supply chain to bargain over and to distribute joint surplus. We
have also shown that it is not as important to create as many property rights as there are inputs.
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7 Appendix A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The combination of the two incentive constraints implies that (g
N)  (g
N). By Spence-Mirrless condition,
0 > 0 and hence g
N  g
N (Monotonicity condition).
Because the participation constraints are type dependent, the search for equilibrium requires to consider several
cases. Let us ￿rst represent the four constraints (10), (11), (14), and (15) in the space (V ;V ).
The analysis is restricted to the region delimited by the two participation constraints and located above the 45
line because the boundaries of the two incentive constraints V = V + (g
N) and V = V   (g
N) have positive











be the intersection between the two participation constraints lines and let
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be the line parallel to the two incentive constraints lines passing
through E. D represents the high type’s reservation pro￿t and shows the extent to which she has a better
outside opportunity than the low type.
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FN would like to compensate the high type vs the low type no more than the outside option di￿erential V0.
However, because V0 is so small, the high type can obtain a better compensation by lying to FN. If this happens
the high type can potentially generate a cost saving of (g
N) which is greater than the outside opportunity V0.
So, the high type has an incentive to misrepresent herself and receive an information rent. It follows that IR is
slack while IC must be binding: V = V + (g
N).
Besides, by lying the low type would incur an extra cost of access of (g
N) that is greater than V0 (since 0 > 0).
Therefore, she has no incentive to lie, which implies that IC is irrelevant and IR is binding: V = 
nc
S .
Plugging V and V in (16) and deriving the ￿rst order conditions yields:
max
f(g






























































































N . There is no allocative
distortion for the high type, but there is a downward distortion for the low type: FN requires an optimal access
to the genetic resources from the high type and a sub-optimal access to the low type. These allocations give





















From the diagram, the pro￿t maximizing point for FN is S1 at which both the low type participation constraint
IR and the high type incentive constraint IC are binding.
Case 2: (g
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N), i.e. IC-line is above D while IC-line is below D
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We follow the same reasoning as in Case 1. The high type has no incentive to lie when V0 (di￿erential in
outside option between the two types) is greater than the saving on access cost she would get by mimicking
the low type. Truthful revelation of her type will guarantee her to receive V0￿that she would obtain by not
26cooperating. This implies that IR is binding and IC is always satis￿ed. The low type, on the other hand faces
the same situation as in Case 1, so she has no incentive to lie. Again, her participation constraint IR is binding
and her incentive constraint IC always hold.
In this case, FN achieves the complete information outcome: V = 
nc
S and V = 
nc
S .






















































e￿ciency is reached for both types: FN will have an optimal access to the genetic resources from both types.
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N ), so that IR is binding and IC
holds. On the contrary, the low type now has incentive to misrepresent herself. By doing so, she incurs an extra
cost of access (g
N) that is smaller than the di￿erential in reservation pro￿t in favour of the high type, V0. As
a consequence, IR and IC are binding: V = 
nc
S and V = 
nc
S   (g
N) . From a graphical point of view it is
immediate to see that the optimal point that maximizes FN pro￿t or equivalently minimizes the expected rent
given to the South [p V + (1   p)V ] is S3 where IR and IC bind. The low type receives an information rent
(this is a case of countervailing incentives CI) whereas the high is o￿ered her expected reservation pro￿t.







































































is no allocative distortion for the low type, but there is an upward distortion for the high type: The low type
will supply the genetic resources optimally whereas the high type will be required to supply an excessively high
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